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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this appeal, Josette Marie Horton asserted the district court erred when it denied her
motion to suppress, because the traffic stop of her car was not justified by reasonable suspicion
and therefore violated her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop, because
Ms. Horton’s expired out-of-state registration did not violate the Idaho motor vehicle statutes on
renewal of registration or violations of registration provisions. The definitions of the terms used
in those statutes mean the statutes only apply to vehicles registered under the laws of this state.
But the district court, after it determined not allowing Idaho law enforcement officers to stop
vehicles with expired out-of-state registration was “absurd,” revised the statutes to cover vehicles
registered outside Idaho. The district court therefore violated the rule of statutory interpretation
that prohibits revising an unambiguous statute because it would produce absurd results.
The State, in its Respondent’s Brief, argued the district court did not err when it denied
Ms. Horton’s motion to suppress, because her expired out-of-state registration provided
reasonable, articulable suspicion for the stop. (See Resp. Br., pp.5-14.) The State contended
Ms. Horton was required to comply with the Idaho motor vehicle statutes on renewal of
registration and on violations of registration provisions. (See Resp. Br., p.12.) This Reply Brief
is necessary to show that the State’s argument improperly revises the statutes at issue by reading
the legislative definition of “registration” out of the statutes.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Horton’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Horton’s motion to suppress, because the traffic stop
violated her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Horton’s Motion To Suppress, Because The
Traffic Stop Was Not Justified By Reasonable Suspicion And Therefore Violated Her
Constitutional Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Searches And Seizures

A.

Introduction
Ms. Horton asserts the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress. The

traffic stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion and therefore violated her constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The officer did not have reasonable
suspicion to justify the traffic stop, because the expired Washington State registration did not
violate I.C. §§ 49-430 or 49-456. The definitions of the terms used in sections 49-430 and 49456 mean the statutes do not apply to vehicles registered outside Idaho. By revising the statutes
to cover vehicles registered outside Idaho, the district court violated the rule of statutory
interpretation that prohibits revising an unambiguous statute because it would produce absurd
results. Because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of a violation of sections 49-430
or 49-456, the officer’s traffic stop of Ms. Horton was not justified. The traffic stop was
unlawful and violated her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Thus, the district court erred when it denied Ms. Horton’s motion to suppress.

B.

The Officer Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Justify The Traffic Stop
Ms. Horton asserts the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop.

The expired Washington registration did not violate sections 49-430 or 49-456.

The term

“registration,” as used in sections 49-430 and 49-456, means “the registration certificate or
certificates and license plate or plates issued under the laws of this state pertaining to the
registration of vehicles.” I.C. § 49-119(9). Thus, those statutes only apply to vehicles registered
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under the laws of this state. See Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., 160 Idaho 223, 226 (2016). The
statutes do not apply to a vehicle registered outside Idaho, such as Ms. Horton’s car with its
Washington license plate, because an out-of-state vehicle would not have registration certificates
or license plates issued under the laws of this state. By revising the unambiguous language of
the statutes to cover vehicles registered outside Idaho (see Tr. p.57, Ls.6-18), the district court
violated the rule of statutory interpretation that prohibits revising an unambiguous statute
because it would produce absurd results. See Verska v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho
889, 893, 896 (2011).
Similarly, the State’s argument improperly revises the language of sections 49-430 and
49-456. The State contends the statutes apply to vehicles registered outside Idaho, because
“Idaho Code § 49-456 and 49-430, and the entire Motor Vehicle Code, apply to all drivers in
Idaho, including non-residents.” (See Resp. Br., p.12 (citing I.C. §§ 49-1408(1) & 49-2420).)1
Thus, the State argues that Ms. Horton, “like all operators of vehicles in Idaho was required to
comply with § 49-456 and § 49-430, both of which require[] current registration.” (Resp.
Br., p.12.)
The State’s argument improperly revises sections 49-430 and 49-456 by reading the
legislative definition of “registration” out of the statutes. The Idaho Legislature has defined
“registration” as “the registration certificate or certificates and license plate or plates issued
under the laws of this state pertaining to the registration of vehicles.” I.C. § 49-119(9) (emphasis

1

Section 49-1408(1) provides: “All of the provisions of this title apply both to residents and
nonresidents of Idaho, except the special provisions in this section which shall govern
misdemeanor violations in respect to nonresidents under the circumstances stated.” I.C. § 491408(1).
Section 49-2420 provides: “Subject to compliance with the motor vehicle laws of Idaho,
nonresident owners, operators of, and persons riding in motor vehicles hereby are granted the
privilege of using the highways of Idaho.” I.C. § 49-2420.
5

added). This legislative definition controls and dictates the meaning of the term “registration” as
used in sections 49-430 and 49-456. See Mayer, 160 Idaho at 226.
For example, section 49-430 provides, “[r]eregistration of vehicles shall be accomplished
annually or by registration period in the same manner as the original registration and upon the
payment of the required fee.” I.C. § 49-430(1). Using the legislative definition of “registration,”
the “original registration” referred to in this statute constitutes the registration certificates and
license plates issued under the laws of this state. See I.C. § § 49-119(9). Similarly, section 49456 is titled: “Violations of registration provisions.” I.C. § 49-456. Based on the legislative
definition of “registration,” the statute therefore covers violations of the provisions governing
registration certificates and license plates issued under the laws of this state. See I.C. § § 49119(9). Further, Chapter 4 of Title 49 of the Idaho Code, where sections 49-430 and 49-456 are
located, is titled “Motor Vehicle Registration.” This chapter title must also use the legislative
definition of “registration.” See Mayer, 160 Idaho at 226.
The State has not explained how a vehicle registered outside Idaho, such as Ms. Horton’s
vehicle with its Washington license plate, could have registration certificates and license plates
issued under the laws of this state pertaining to the registration of vehicles. By arguing sections
49-430 and 49-456 apply to vehicles registered outside Idaho, the State reads the legislative
definition of “registration” out of the statutes. This is improper, because the definition of
“registration” the Idaho Legislature provided in section 49-119(9) controls the meaning of that
term within the statutes. See Mayer, 160 Idaho at 226.
State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 (2013), also militates against the State’s argument that
sections 49-430 and 49-456 apply to vehicles registered outside Idaho. I.C. § 49-428, one of the
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statutes at issue in Morgan, see id. at 110-12, provides that “[l]icense plates assigned to a motor
vehicle shall be attached, one (1) in the front and the other in the rear . . . .” I.C. § 49-428(1).
The officer in Morgan stopped the defendant’s vehicle after seeing the defendant’s
vehicle did not have a front license plate, believing that was a violation of section 49-428.
Morgan, 154 Idaho at 110. In the defendant’s appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress,
the State conceded “that the district court erred in its conclusion that the officer had a reasonable
articulable suspicion that Morgan had violated” section 49-428. Id. at 111. The Idaho Supreme
Court held, “Idaho Code § 49-428 requires that a vehicle registered in Idaho display both front
and rear license plates. This requirement does not extend to vehicles registered in other states.”
Id. at 112. The officer testified he saw the rear license plate prior to the stop, the plate was not
from Idaho, and at that point there was no reason to pull the vehicle over for a license plate
violation. See id. Thus, the Morgan Court concluded that, “[i]n view of Idaho law and this
testimony, the district court erred in its determination that the officer had a reasonable suspicion
to believe that a violation of I.C. § 49-428 had occurred.” Id.
While the State argues that sections 49-430 and 49-456 apply here because the entire
Motor Vehicle Code applies to all drivers in Idaho (see Resp. Br., p.12), Morgan shows that
some parts of the Idaho motor vehicle statutes do not apply to vehicles registered outside Idaho.
Notably, the Idaho Supreme Court in Morgan did not hold that sections 49-1408(1) and 49-2420
meant section 49-428 required vehicles registered in other states to display both front and rear
license plates. See Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112. The Morgan Court instead held section 49-428
only applied to vehicles “registered in Idaho.” See id. Extending the logic of Morgan to the
instant case, sections 49-1408(1) and 49-2420 do not mean sections 49-430 and 49-456 apply to
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vehicles registered in other states.2 Thanks to the legislative definition of “registration,” as used
in sections 49-430 and 49-456, those sections only require vehicles registered in Idaho to
maintain current registration. See I.C. § 49-119(9).
If the Idaho Legislature had intended to make the operation of a vehicle with expired outof-state registration a violation of the Idaho motor vehicle statutes, it could have enacted a
separate statute expressly requiring vehicles from outside Idaho to have current registration in
their state of origin.

See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 27-14-1704(a); Wash. Rev. Code

§ 46.16A.160(1)(a) & (b). However, the Idaho Legislature’s current definition of “registration”
precludes interpreting sections 49-430 and 49-456 to that end.

By reading the legislative

definition of “registration” out of the statutes, the State’s argument improperly revises sections
49-430 and 49-456. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 893; Mayer, 160 Idaho at 226.
The district court erred when it denied Ms. Horton’s motion to suppress. Despite the
State’s arguments to the contrary, sections 49-430 and 49-456 do not apply to vehicles registered
outside Idaho, such as Ms. Horton’s car. The officer did not have reasonable suspicion of a

2

Morgan also recognizes that other states may have different requirements for vehicle licensing
and registration. While Idaho requires the display of both front and rear license plates, other
states may require only the display of a rear license plate. See Brief of Appellant at 9, State v.
Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 (2013) (No. 38305), 2011 WL 3471424 at *9 (“Mr. Morgan’s vehicle
was not licensed through Idaho but through the State of Arkansas, where a license plate is only
required to be attached to the rear of the vehicle when one plate is issued, and thus Mr. Morgan’s
SUV was not being operated in violation of § 49-428.”).
Likewise, while Idaho requires vehicles to maintain current registration at all times, some
other states have a grace period permitting vehicles to operate with expired tabs for a limited
time. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-3-114 (“Every vehicle registration under this article shall
expire on the last day of the month at the end of each twelve-month registration period and shall
be renewed, upon application by the owner, the payment of the fees required by law, and in
accordance with section 42-3-113(3), not later than the last day of the month following the day
of the month following the date of expiration.”); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 29-A, § 351(2) (“The owner
or operator of a vehicle stopped by a law enforcement officer and having a registration that has
expired within the last 30 days must be issued a warning, rather than a summons, in a form
designated by the Chief of the State Police.”).
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violation of sections 49-430 or 49-456, or of any other violation. Thus, the officer’s traffic stop
of Ms. Horton was not justified and unlawful. The evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful
traffic stop, in violation of Ms. Horton’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, may not be used against her. The district court’s order denying the motion
to suppress should be reversed.3

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Ms. Horton respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of judgment and
commitment, reverse the order which denied her motion to suppress, and remand the case to the
district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 17th day of July, 2018.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

3

Regarding the basis for Ms. Horton’s motion to suppress, the State argues, “[t]he other potential
reasons for [the] stop (including speeding and attempted elud[ing]) were not challenged below.
Thus, the scope of this appeal is limited to whether an expired Washington registration provides
reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop.” (Resp. Br., p.8) The State then contends, “in the
event the order denying [Ms.] Horton’s motion to suppress is reversed, [Ms.] Horton can
determine, on remand, whether to challenge the other [bases] for the stop in front of the district
court.” (Resp. Br., p.8.)
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of July, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, electronically as follows to:
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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